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ABSTRACT 
 
A common FDI pattern observed across Korean parents investing in China is that they invest sequentially. Revoking 
that Korean parents are intended to achieve production efficiency in China, the economies of scale of a sequential 
investment strategy is relatively lower compared to a large scale one-shot investment; however, the latest production 
technologies can be applied to sequentially established subsidiaries, which can open a strategic pathway to leapfrog 
other competitors in the long run. A game model is constructed to demonstrate that as longer the Korean parents are 
expected to stay in China, they are better off by pursuing a sequential investment strategy. Unfortunately, this result 
does not mean that they can leapfrog competitors through sequential investment strategy. This can happen only when 
they begin with larger resource endowments. The model predicts that, under the lack of resources in establishing 
Chinese subsidiaries, Korean firms’ leapfrogging through sequential investment strategy can occur if technology 
shocks occur to follow-up investments after an initial investment is done. A scenario approach is performed to prove 
this prediction empirically. It turns out that the firm value of those Korean parents that pursue sequential investment 
strategy increases the most when the longer they operate in China and when their research and development 
investments are higher at the same time. Also, as they stay longer in China, they are intended to make more sequential 
investments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ince bilateral diplomatic relationship was established in 1992, Korean firms have penetrated into Chinese 
market. It is not too much to say that Korean firms’ Chinese FDI’s owe a lot to cultural closeness between 
two countries (Boeh & Beamish, 2015; Chan, Makino & Isobe, 2010). They were mostly aimed at 
expanding the scale of productions for overcoming globalization drive. A peculiar investment pattern commonly 
observed across Korean firms draws out our attention; in that, a few Korean firms have established subsidiaries 
sequentially rather than pursuing one-shot investments only. The strategic advantage of one-shot investment is to 
achieve higher production efficiency, which provides a stronger foundation to compete against competitors; however, 
tied-in effect can cause huge opportunity costs in the long-run. For those industries characterized by short product life 
cycles, investing a large scale one-shot investment may not be an appropriate FDI strategy. In contrast, a sequential 
investment strategy cannot create the economies of scale compared to the one-shot investment, but it can construct 
flexible production portfolios by adopting the latest technologies available. This is a real option view; sequential 
investments enable to adjust the levels of investment between the distinct stages of PLC (Du, Lu & Tao, 2012). 
Fundamentally, FDI has technology spillover effect and its effect is spatially diffused (Kim & Hemmert, 2016). By 
this respect, the sequential investment strategy is an effective competitive strategy to earn spillover effects. Of course, 
learning effect can enhance the performance of sequentially established subsidiaries avoiding strong tied-in effect 
while expanding networking ties that are critical to Korean firms’ Chinese operations (Lin & Kwan, 2016). China has 
two hubs for subnational activities. Beijing is a political hub and Shanghai is an economic hub. These two hubs lead 
both political and economic policies and subnational geographical distance becomes to affect province-level economic 
performances (Murphy, Andraszewicz & Knaus, 2016).  
 
Reflecting these discussions, sequential investment strategy, taking advantage of regional specialization through 
follow-up investments, can be considered as an efficient strategy, which enables Koran firms to take advantage of real 
options in China. According to Song (2014), geographical proximity affects positively to the financial performance 
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of Japanese parents’ Chinese subsidiaries; hence, one can expect that Korean parents can add more firm values as long 
as their sequentially established subsidiaries are not that remotely apart.  
 
This paper tackles three mains issues taking time value into consideration because sequential investment strategy is 
pursued from the long-run perspective. First, whether sequential investment strategy can generate efficient production 
effects to Korean parents with multi Chinese subsidiaries is scrutinized. Second, it is analyzed if they can enjoy better 
production effects through sequential investments as the longer they stay in China. Third, it is under curiosity if 
sequential investments can open a strategic pathway to leapfrog large competitors.  
 
For this purpose, a game model is constructed to draw out theoretic predictions and it is highlighted if sequential 
investment strategy can be used as a competitive strategy for Korean parents with Chinese subsidiaries. In the model, 
the longer they are expected to stay in China, Korean parents are more likely to pursue the sequential investment 
strategy. Korean parents may not be able to leapfrog other competitors through sequential investments generically; 
however, once technology shocks occur to sequentially established Chinese subsidiaries, then they might be able to 
leapfrog.  
 
These theoretic predictions are examined empirically under a scenario approach. Because sequential investments are 
pursued from a long-run perspective while the latest technologies are applied to lately established Chinese subsidiaries, 
the age of Chinese subsidiaries and parent firm-wise R&D (research and development) investments can combinedly 
affect firm values as well as the frequency of follow-up investments. This paper is organized as the follows. Section 
2 constructs the game model and second 3 reports the characteristics of Korean parents’ Chinese sequential 
investments. Empirical results are contained in section 4 and section 5 summarizes concluding remarks. 
 
2. THE GAME MODEL 
 
2.1 One-Shot Investment Strategy vs. Sequential Investment Strategy 
 𝑖 implements FDI (foreign direct investment) in China at 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑗 is 𝑖’s competitor in China. 𝑖 can make either 
one-shot investment or sequential investments for establishing subsidiaries in China. Market price is characterized by 
an inverse demand curve given to 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑄; the larger the production is, the lower the market price will be. Once 𝑖 
establishes its subsidiaries, they are expected to be sustained till 𝑡 = 𝑛 − 1. Against 𝑖’s penetration, 𝑗 invests a large 
scale one-shot investment, i.e., 𝑄+ at 𝑡 = 0, which is denoted as the OQI strategy of 𝑄+.  
 
Given  𝑗 ’s investment, 𝑖  has two different investment options. First, it can either invest a small-scale one-shot 
investment, i.e., 𝑞+ only at t = 0 where 𝑄+ > 𝑞+, which is denoted as the OqI strategy. Second, it can invest 𝑞+ at 𝑡 =0 and does a follow-up investment 𝑞/ at 𝑡 = 1 sequentially, which is denoted as a sequential investment (SI) strategy. 
By SI, Korean parents become to be able to respond to local competitors’ technological evolution in timely fashion. 
Without the loss of generosity, it is assumed that neither 𝑖 nor 𝑗 considers any follow-up investment once they choose 
OQI and OqI. With a view to real option theory, investments are less likely to be done as market exits are more likely 
to occur frequently [7]. The net present values of 𝑖’s production under OqI and SI are given to (1) and (2) and that of 𝑗’s production under OQI is given to (3).  
 𝑂123 = 	 (/678/67 )𝑞+  (1) 
 𝑂12: = ;/678/67 <𝑞+ + ;7678/67 < 𝑞/  (2) 
 𝑂1>? = (/678/67 )𝑄+    (3) 
 
Obviously, 𝑂1>? > 𝑂123 because the production effect of the large scale one-shot investment dominates that of the small-
scale one-shot investment. Proposition 1 suggests that SI is preferred if Korean parents are generically intended to 
operate their Chinese subsidiaries in a longer time span.  
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Proposition 1. The longer 𝑖 is expected to stay in China, 𝑖 becomes to be inclined to pursue 𝑂12:. 
 
Proof. When 𝑛 → 𝑛 + 1, 𝑂12|BC/3 − 𝑂12|B3 = 	𝛿B𝑞+ while 𝑂12|BC/: − 𝑂12|B: =	= 𝛿B(𝑞+ + 𝑞/) > 0. Thus, E𝑂12|BC/: −𝑂12|B: F > G𝑂12|BC/3 − 𝑂12|B3 H. 
 
At a glance, one can say that the more 𝑖 is patient, the more 𝑖 is likely to pursue SI. However, this prediction does not 
hold up according to Proposition 2. In other words, OqI is left as a valid investment strategy to 𝑖; of course, 𝑖 will 
remain as 𝑗’ follower if it uses OqI. 
 
Proposition 2. Even when 𝑖 is patient enough,	𝑖 would not choose SI necessarily.  
 
Proof.  IJ1KLI7 = (/678)(/67)M 𝑞+ + (7678)(/67)M 𝑞/ − B787(/67) (𝑞+ + 𝑞/) . Given that 1 +⋯+ 𝛿B6/ = /678(/67)  and 𝛿 +⋯+𝛿B6/ = 7678(/67), both /678(/67)M and 7678(/67)M are positive; however, − O787(/67) is negative and so the sing of  IJ1KLI7  is not 
clearly determined.  
 
Proposition 3 demonstrates that SI itself cannot bring competitive advantage to 𝑖 as OQI has a larger production effect 
fundamentally. This result originates from the fact that the economies of scale from OQI outweighs the time value of 
SI. In practice, differences in initial resource capacity between 𝑖 and 𝑗 may prevent 𝑖’s leapfrogging, which means that 𝑖 is induced to pursue SI due to lack in initial resource. Nevertheless, it cannot be simply concluded that SI is a less 
efficient competitive strategy when it comes to FDI yet.  
 
Proposition 3. Even when 𝑖’s total sum of sequential investments is identical to 𝑗’s large scale one-shot investment,  𝑗’s production effect dominates 𝑖’s. 
 
Proof. 𝑂1>? − 𝑂12: = ;/678/67 <(𝑄+ − 𝑞+) − ;7678/67 < 𝑞/. Given 𝑄+ = 𝑞+ + 𝑞/, 𝑂1>? − 𝑂12:|?PQ3PC3R=𝑞/ > 0. 
 
Proposition 4 demonstrates that initial investment plays a more important role in creating the production effect of SI. 
Practically, this indicates that 𝑞/ has smaller discounted value. Reflecting the accumulation of market know-how, 𝑖 
needs to pay more attention to the initial investment under SI. 
 
Proposition 4. Even when 𝑖 is a patient sequential investor, the marginal contribution of the initial investment is 
greater than that of the follow-up investment.  
 
Proof. IMJ1KLI7I3P − IMJ1KLI7I3R = (1 − 𝛿) > 0 
 
2.2. Leapfrogging under Technology Shock 
 
The previous section reveals that 𝑖 may not choose SI and, unfortunately, it cannot leapfrog 𝑗 through SI. Then, a 
naturally intriguing curiosity is whether 𝑖 can make it possible to leapfrog. If so, first, under which condition and, 
second, how 𝑖 can leapfrog 𝑗 through SI needs to be analyzed. This question is similar to ask if SI can produce larger 
production effect than OQI can in the long-run. 
 
It is meaningless to test if 𝑖  can dominate 𝑗 under 𝑄+ < 𝑞+ + 𝑞/ . Rather, it is necessary to analyze if 𝑖  can take 
advantage of 𝑆𝐼  under 𝑄+ ≥ 𝑞+ + 𝑞/  anyhow although Proposition 3 denies such possibility. One important 
acknowledgement is that 𝑞/ is produced by the latest production technology, which can provide a strategic advantage 
for 𝑖 to enhance production efficiency. Now, it is assumed that a shock occurs to 𝑞/ as such 𝑄+ = 𝑞+ + 𝜀𝑞/.  
 
Then, it needs to be discussed what should be the scale for 𝜀 in order to outcompete 𝑗. If 𝜀 is greater than one, it is 
straightforward to seeing that 𝑞+ + 𝜀𝑞/ > 𝑄+ , which makes 𝑖  dominate 𝑗  easily. Then, a fundamental issue is to 
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scrutinize whether 𝑖 can enjoy production advantage even under 0 < 𝜀 ≤ 1, i.e. 𝑄+ > 𝑞+ + 𝜀𝑞/. Because Chinese 
local firms become to replace Korean firms’ production through technological evolutions (Yim & Jung, 2016), Korean 
firms need to devote more resources to earn 𝜀 as the more their internal resources are restricted. The inverse demand 
curve is redefined as 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑂12: − 𝑂1>? under the technology shock. 
 
It is a common knowledge that market price is lowered as the market becomes to be matured; however, Proposition 5 
shows how 𝑖 can circumvent such pattern when 𝜀 occurs. In fact, 𝑖 can enjoy a higher price through SI overcoming 
the tied-in effects of OQI. Most of all, it is worthwhile mentioning that the price effect in Proposition 5 can occur even 
when 𝜀 ≤ 1. Such price effect again can prolong 𝑖’s market residency.  
 
Proposition 5. SI under technology shock can increase market price even in a matured market.  
 
Proof. Given 𝑄+ = 𝑞+ + 𝜀𝑞/ , IYI?P = −2 (/678)/67 𝑄+ < 0 but	 IYI3R = [(/678)/67 𝜀 − (7678)/67 \ ≥ 0 if  (7678)(/678) ≤ 𝜀 ≤ 1. 
Because (7678)(/678) ≤ 1, IYI3R > 0 for any (7678)(/678) ≤ 𝜀 ≤ 1. 
 
Proposition 6 explains how SI can outperform OQI, which suggests that SI opens a strategic pathway to outcompete 
OQI. Figure 1 exactly depicts how this can work. Under 𝑄+ − 𝑞+ ≤ (7678)(/678) 𝑞/ where marked as dashed lines, it is 𝑂12: ≥𝑂1>?. Surely, OQI becomes to dominate SI if 𝑄+ − 𝑞+ > (7678)(/678) 𝑞/. Thus, 𝑗 can lead 𝑖 as long as the scale of  𝑗’s OQI 
dominates 𝑖’s initial investment; however, 𝑖 can have a chance to leapfrog 𝑗 if it becomes 𝑄+ − 𝑞+ ≤ (7678)(/678) 𝑞/ through 
the technology shock. In practice, dynamic learning enhances the efficacy of local subsidiaries’ access to internal 
resources and thus technology shocks from either headquarters or subsidiaries can be interchanged simultaneously, 
which expands the impact of technology shocks. 
 
Proposition 6. In the long-run, the production effect under SI can dominate that of a large scale one-shot investment 
under OQI if technology shocks can fill up the scale of productions between OQI and SI.  
 
Proof. 𝑂1>? − 𝑂12: = G(/678)/67 𝜀 − (7678)/67 H 𝑞/ . Given 𝑄+ = 𝑞+ + 𝜀𝑞/ , 𝑂1>? > 𝑂12:  if 𝑄+ > 𝑞+ + (7678)(/678) 𝑞/  but 𝑂12: ≥𝑂1>? if 𝑞+ < 𝑄+ ≤ 𝑞+ + (7678)(/678) 𝑞/ where (7678)(/678) < 1. 
 
Figure 1. The Mechanism for Small-and Medium-size Firms’ Leapfrogging 
 
 
 
  
450 
Q0 
q1 0 
𝑸𝟎 = 𝒒𝟎 + (𝜹 − 𝜹𝒏)(𝟏 − 𝜹𝒏) 𝒒𝟏 
𝑄0 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞1 
𝑶d𝒊𝒔 ≥ 𝑶d𝒋𝑸 
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3. EMPIRICAL WORKS 
 
3.1. The Characteristics of Korean Parents’ Chinese Sequential Investments  
 
Korean parents pursuing sequential investments in China are identified through ‘Foreign Operating Korean Firms 
Directory 2011/12’ published by KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency) as used in Zeng, Shenkar, 
Lee, & Song, 2013. The book is a semi-annually published public data book and Table 1 summarizes 132 Korean 
parents’ Chinese FDI characteristics earned from the public data book.  
 
KOSPI listed Korean parents have, on average, 1.93 Chinese subsidiaries along to the maximum of 14. An eye-
catching observation is that external audited Korean firms have more Chinese subsidiaries than KOSADQ listed 
parents. Furthermore, their average subsidiary size is also greater than KOSADQ listed parents. This observation 
reveals that small- and medium-size Korean firms have been pursuing Chinese sequential investments striving to 
obtain production effects. Also, Chinese government’s FDI incentive policy seems to be successful as many Korean 
parents establish Chinese subsidiaries in SEZ (special economic zone) . 
 
 
Table 1. The Chinese FDI’s of Korean Parents 
 Classifications Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min. Max. 
The Number of Chinese 
Subsidiaries 
KOSPI 60 1.93 2.67 0 14 
KOSDAQ 26 .58 1.27 0 5 
External Audited 43 .74 1.14 0 6 
Located in SEZ 61 1.34 2.37 0 14 
Subsidiary Size1 
KOSPI 60 $41.27 $10.01 $1.0 $678.70 
KOSDAQ 26 $10.41 $10.25 $1.3 $31.0 
External Audited 43 $15.53 $30.60 $1.0 $186.45 
Located in SEZ  61 $29.15 $57.0 $1.0 $365.57 
1. Subsidiary size is measured by million-dollar basis. 
2. Source: KOTRA, Foreign Operating Korean Firms Directory 2011/12. 
 
 
3.2. Empirical Framework 
 
(4)-(6) are designed to examine the contributions of Korean Parents’ 𝑆𝐼 to the total firm values measured by market 
capitalization. 𝑦2 is natural logged market capitalization in 2012. 𝑐 is a constant while 𝑐/j, 𝑐kj, and 𝑐lj are industry 
dummies.1 In (4), 𝑠no,2 (𝑠qr,2) is a dummy that gives the value of one to those firms that made follow-up investments 
within (after) four (five) years ex post its initial investment. If 𝑠qr,2 has a larger effect than 𝑠no,2, it can be said that the 
latest follow-up investments contribute more to Korean parents’ firm values. As explanatory variables, 𝑠𝑧2 represents 
the investment size of Korean parents’ subsidiaries. 𝑒2 is labor equipment ratio, 𝑐𝑖2 is capital intensity, 𝑟𝑖2 is R&D 
intensity, 𝑚𝑖2 is marketing intensity, which are adjusted by 𝑖’s total assets.  
 
In (5), 𝑠𝑔j represents the number of subsidiaries that are established by green field investment and 𝑠𝑚j does the 
number of subsidiaries established by M&A (mergers and acquisitions) .  From the long-run perspective, 𝑠𝑔j  is 
expected to show larger effects. (6) attempts a scenario analysis. 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz represents the case when subsidiary age 
measured by initial investment is older than the average subsidiary’s age of the sample and when Korean firms’ R&D 
investments are higher than the average R&D investment of the sample at the same time.	𝑎𝑔𝑟jz{, 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z, and 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z are 
similarly defined but 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z is dropped to avoid dummy trap. If 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z can have larger effects compared to 𝑎𝑔𝑟jz{, one 
can say that technology shock obviously plays an important role in expanding 𝑖’s total firm value. 𝑛𝑠2 is the number 
of 𝑖’s subsidiaries. 
  
                                                             
1  C1 Manufacturing includes Paper, textile, apparel, foods and C2 Manufacturing does electricity, electronics, machinery, steel, metal, and 
chemicals. C3 Manufacturing includes transportation industry and service industry does telecommunication, service, construction, education. C1, 
C2, C3, and service industries occupy 13%, 54%, 16%, and 16%, respectively. In order to avoid dummy trap, service industry dummy is dropped. 
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𝑦2 = 𝑐 + 𝑐/j + 𝑐kj + 𝑐lj + 𝑠no,2 + 𝑠qr,2 + 𝑠𝑧2 + 𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑖2 + 𝑚𝑖2 + 𝜀2   (4) 
 𝑦2 = 𝑐 + 𝑐/j + 𝑐kj + 𝑐lj + 𝑠𝑔j + 𝑠𝑚j + 𝑠𝑧2 + 𝑒 + 𝑐𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑖2 + 𝑚𝑖2 + 𝜀2  (5) 
 𝑦2 = 𝑐 + 𝑐/j + 𝑐kj + 𝑐lj + 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz + 𝑎𝑔𝑟jz{ + 𝑎𝑔|j{{ + 𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑠𝑧2 + 𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑖2 + 𝑚𝑖2 + 𝜀2    (6) 
 
(7) can exhibit whether Korean parents pursue 𝑆𝐼 when they are expected to stay longer in China. The dependent 
variable 𝑎𝑔2  is 𝑖 ’s length of residency in China which is measured by the total years of operation through 𝑖 ’s 
subsidiaries. If 𝑛𝑠2  shows a positive and significant coefficient, it implies that as longer the residency of Korean 
parents in China is, the more the follow-up investments are likely to be invested. (8) tests under which scenario Korean 
parents become to pursue 𝑆𝐼. 
 𝑎𝑔2 = 𝑐 + 𝑐/j + 𝑐kj + 𝑐lj + 𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑖2 +𝑚𝑖2 + 𝜀2  (7) 
 𝑛𝑠2 = 𝑐 + 𝑐/j + 𝑐kj + 𝑐lj + 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz + 𝑎𝑔𝑟jz{ + 𝑎𝑔|j{{ + 𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑖2 +𝑚𝑖2 + 𝜀2  (8) 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2 contains the estimation results for (4)-(6). 𝑠qr,2  is estimated to be positive and significant while 𝑠no,2  is 
insignificant, which suggests that those Korean parents that made follow-up investments lately can earn more from 𝑆𝐼. Between green field investment and M&A, the former can add more firm values.  
 
The scenario analysis reveals that both 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz and 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z have positive and significant effects but 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz show a larger 
effect. This demonstrates that technology shock is the main driver for 𝑆𝐼. Also, its effect becomes to be dominant as 
longer the Korean parents are expected to stay in China as well.  
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Table 2. The Contribution of SI to Korean Parents’ Firm Value 
Variables Dependent Variable: Total Market Capitalization Eq. (4) Eq. (5) Eq. (6) 
Constant -5.3303
*** -4.8150** -3.0585 
(1.9970) (2.0264) (1.9800) 𝑐/j -2.3059*** -2.2944*** -1.9956*** (0.8473) (0.8421) (0.7467) 𝑐kj -2.2900*** -2.2950*** -1.7186*** (0.7276) (0.7308) (0.5115) 𝑐lj -1.5538** -1.5689** -0.9788 (0.7660) (0.7622) (0.6120) 𝑠no,2 0.2147 - - (0.1442)   𝑠qr,2 0.2205*** - - (0.0591)   𝑠𝑔j - 0.2770*** -  (0.0851)  𝑠𝑚j - -0.0982 -  (0.3747)  𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz - - 2.8197***   (0.2798) 𝑎𝑔𝑟jz{ - - 0.2244   (0.4003) 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z - - 1.5622***   (0.4242) 𝑛𝑠2 - - 0.0968*   (0.0565) 𝑠𝑧2 0.5639*** 0.5307*** 0.3674* (0.1260) (0.1261) (0.1290) 𝑒2 2.6865*** 2.7510*** 2.6154*** (0.9371) (0.9018) (0.5374) 𝑐𝑖2 -0.0046 -0.0135 -0.0066*** (0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0121) 𝑟𝑖2 0.2983*** 0.2933*** - (0.0944) (0.0927)  𝑚𝑖2 0.0913 0.0851 0.1321* (0.0923) (0.0938) (0.0666) 𝑅k 0.5014 0.5122 0.6226 
Obs. 87 87 87 
1. For correcting heterogeneity, White standard errors are reported 
2. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
According to Table 3, 𝑛𝑠2 has a positive and significant coefficient on subsidiary age, which points out that those 
Korean parents owning multi subsidiaries in China are likely to be those group of firms stay longer in Chia. In parallel 
to Table 2, both 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz and 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z have positive and significant effects on 𝑛𝑠2; the number of Korean parents’ Chinese 
subsidiaries will be increasing more under 𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz. 
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Table 3. The Scenario Approach on Korean Parents’ Time Value 
Variables Dependent Variable: Subsidiaries’ Age Dependent Variable: The Number of Chinese Subsidiaries 
Constant 2.2136
*** 0.4478 
(0.1089) (0.4513) 𝑐/j 0.1342 -0.3874 (0.1238) (0.5101) 𝑐kj 0.0291 -0.2302 (0.1066) (0.4653) 𝑐lj -0.2007 -0.4160 (0.1630) (0.4687) 𝑛𝑠2 0.0448** - (0.020)  𝑎𝑔𝑟jzz - 2.0299**  (0.8566) 𝑎𝑔𝑟jz{ - 0.4285  (0.4862) 𝑎𝑔𝑟j{z - 0.5719*  (0.2943) 𝑒2 -0.2848 1.7222** (.2438) (0.8953) 𝑐𝑖2 -0.0088** 0.1199*** (.0034) (0.0073) 𝑟𝑖2 -0.00180 - (.0255)  𝑚𝑖2 0.0155 0.0574** (.0207) (0.0416) 𝑅k 0.1087 0.2785 
Obs. 131 131 
1. For correcting heterogeneity, White standard errors are reported 
2. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main theme of the paper was to explore if sequential investment strategy can provide strategic advantages to 
Korean parents investing in China and, if so, how such advantages can be applied in real businesses were scrutinized 
in several ways. According to the game model’s predictions, sequential investment strategy itself does not necessarily 
make them lead market competition. However, once technology shocks occur, then sequentially established 
subsidiaries became to be able to enhance their discounted values while achieving more refined production efficiency. 
 
This outcome provides several strategic momenta to small- and medium-size enterprises. Under one-shot game 
architecture, they are not able to outcompete large competitors generically due to lack in resource endowments. 
Technology shocks can fill up resource differences between the group of small- and medium-size firms and large 
firms; as a result, they can leapfrog large competitors under one-shot investment strategy even with a smaller total 
sum of sequential investment. The key point was turned out to be their patience because they can pursue sequential 
investments looking forward to earning new innovations. Another advantage is that technology shocks, combined with 
sequential investments, can prolong product life cycles, which can be highlighted as another critical factor to explain 
how leapfrogging occurs in real business area.  
 
Therefore, it can be said that sequential investments are necessary for Korean parents to compete in China but 
technology shocks, that can support sequentially established subsidiaries, are sufficient to expand production effects 
through sequential investments.  
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